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Abstrat
Reently more and more attention has been paid to
the intrusion detetion systems (IDS) whih don't
rely on signature based detetion approah. Suh
solutions try to inrease their defense level by using
heuristis detetion methods like network-level em-
ulation. This tehnique allows the intrusion dete-
tion systems to stop unknown threats, whih nor-
mally ouldn't be stopped by standard signature
detetion tehniques.
In this artile author will desribe general on-
epts of network-level emulation tehnique inlud-
ing its advantages and disadvantages (weak sides)
together with providing potential ountermeasures
against this type of detetion method.
1 Introdution
Intrusion detetion systems were designed to detet
and deny unauthorized aess attempts launhed
mainly through a network. Together with the
growth of the Internet number of suh attempts in-
reased dramatially. Most of the known network
attaks are designed diretly to ompromise the se-
urity of a targeted omputer system. This inludes
variety of haking attempts against vulnerable ser-
vies, unauthorized aess to sensitive data and all
types of malware (viruses, worms et.). We have
already seen worms that infeted millions of om-
puter systems in a very short period of time, like
Blaster worm whih infeted more the 25 million
unique omputer mahines [11℄. Intrusion detetion
systems objetive is to detet suh attaks and take
all the neessary ations to prevent further spread.
Most of the IDS still rely on the signature (pattern)
mathing approah. Basially they are onstantly
listening to the network tra and trying to
nd spei signature inside the paket data.
When a potentially maliious pattern is found,
intrusion detetion system bloks the paket from
going "deeper" into the network. The signature
detetion approah often plagues IDS with high
number of false positives alerts [15, 22℄. In fat,
there are many IDS attaks whih make a nasty
usage of this issue (for example the old squealing
attak [14℄).
The pattern mathing approah was (and in
fat still is) heavily used in antivirus software.
Somewhere in the end of 80s (early 90s) rst
polymorphi viruses started to appear [1, 9℄.
The 1260 virus (also known as Chameleon) is
onsidered as the rst polymorphi virus. The
1260 virus, reated by Mark Washburn, was in fat
a fusion between the Vienna virus (written, and
then published by Ralf Burger in his book) and the
Casade virus (the rst self-enrypting le virus).
Washburn extended the initial Casade virus teh-
nique, whih resulted in the reation of deryptor
with mutable body. Deryptor body was generated
(hanged) upon infetion - of ourse the general
logi of deryption algorithm was preserved. Soon
after this more and more omplex polymorphi
engines started to appear, like the Mutation
Engine (MtE) (reated by Dark Avenger) whih
appeared in 1992 or the DAME engine (reated
by Dark Angel from Phalon/Skism group), whih
appeared in 1993 as a part of 40Hex magazine.
Summing it up, polymorphism is a tehnique that
allows to evade signature detetion by enrypting
ode and reating a deryptor (derypting stub)
1
whih is dierent every generation
1
. Polymor-
phism was applied multiple times [7, 20, 10, 3℄
to shellode generation proess. Polymorphi
shellodes were and still are the ultimate weapon
against intrusion detetion systems based only on
signature detetion approah. However, like in
the antivirus software ase, some ountermeasures
were developed in order to stop polymorphi ode.
For this purpose ode emulation tehnique was
presented. Code emulation is a powerful tehnique
used already for a long time in the antivirus soft-
ware eld (espeially in dealing with polymorphi
viruses with enrypted bodies). Considering the
fat the derypting proedure (deryptor) must
derypt the atual body of the virus before it
atually get exeuted, an ode emulator may be
used to simulate the work of deryptor. When
the original virus body is derypted antivirus
software may proeed with standard pattern
mathing detetion. Of ourse this is the most
optimisti senario. Not so far ago a group of
researhers [16, 17℄ proposed similar solution for
the purpose of intrusion detetion systems. In
their approah alled network-level emulation they
suggested using a CPU emulator to dynamially
analyze every potential instrution sequene in
the monitored network tra in order to loate
exeution behavior of potentially maliious ode.
The network-level emulation does not rely on
pattern mathing approah, what allows it to work
like an heuristis sanner and detet previously
unknown threats.
In this artile, the author will desribe general
assumptions used by intrusion detetion systems
in terms of deteting attaks via using network-
level emulation tehnique. Potential evasion teh-
niques will be presented as well. To the author's
knowledge the only emulation based "IDS" publily
available is a library reated by Paul Baeher and
Markus Koetter alled libemu [2℄. Libemu library
is developed more like a proof of onept than a-
tual stable working produt, so it's funtionality is
quite limited. Due to the lak of others real testing
environments, anti-emulation tehniques presented
in this artile should be treated mostly as theo-
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Author is refering here to the so alled the fast-
polymorphism, not the slow-polymorphism approah where
the main goal is to limit the number of mutated samples -
this ompliates the proess of signature reation.
retial onepts. Bypassing tehniques presented
in this paper will fous only (mostly) on defeating
network-level emulation approah. This paper will
also fous on Windows shellodes, beause they are
naturally bigger and more ompliated then ones
designed to work in *nix systems. Author will also
refer to shellode as a type of shellode whih re-
quires a deryptor.
2 Conepts of network-level
emulation
In order to perform ode emulation intrusion de-
tetion system neessary data must be gathered
rst. To ahieve this IDS monitors lient-initiated
data of the network stream. Typially suh data
may inlude maliious requests like exploitation
attempts. For TCP pakets the appliation-level
stream is reassembled when neessary and in ase
of large lient-initiated streams only some limited
portion of it is inspeted. When the information is
olleted the emulation proess begins. Sine the
shellode position is not known at this point and
the lengths of IA-32 instrutions may dier, emu-
lator must treat every byte in the data buer as a
potential entrypoint of the shellode. Basially the
emulation proess is repeated for eah byte position
found in the gathered data buer. Depending on
the emulated ode behavior it is marked as poten-
tial shellode or not. The detetion method will be
disussed in the next setion.
2.1 Shellode Detetion
This setion will present general shellode arhi-
teture and also the heuristis shellode detetion
mehanisms used in network-level emulation.
2.1.1 Shellode Arhiteture
Typial Windows shellode onsists of three
parts: GetPC ode, deryptor (derypting stub),
enrypted payload (Figure 1).
Where:
• GetPC ode - this part is important beause
shellode deryptor must alulate the orret
address of the enrypted payload - otherwise
2
Figure 1: General omposition of typial Windows
shellode.
the deryption proess will be done wrong.
Sine the nal loation of injeted shellode
annot be predited and on the other hand IA-
32 arhiteture does not provide EIP-relative
addressing mode the shellode address must be
alulated on-the-y (while the shellode exe-
utes)
2
.
• deryptor - this part is responsible for de-
rypting the enrypted payload. In order to
derypt the payload, deryptor must know its
loation (this is provided by GetPC ode),
must be able to read the data from the payload
and also must be able to write the derypted
ode bak (usually to the same plae). A typ-
ial deryption algorithm is a implementation
of simple XOR ipher.
• enrypted payload - this is the eetive part
of the shellode. It performs all the neessary
ations to satisfy the attaker, like binding a
shell to a spei port et. In most of the ases
the payload must be enrypted to avoid using
restrited byte haraters like NULL-bytes -
this is limited by the vulnerability itself. One
the original payload data is deoded, the de-
oder stub passes exeution to it.
2.1.2 Detetion Methods (heuristis)
As it was presented in the previous setion, en-
rypted shellode payload must be derypted in or-
der to retrieve its original funtionality. The de-
ryption proess itself depends on the body of en-
2
Same mehanisms are also used in omputer viruses.
rypted payload - whih is obvious. Therefore the
deryptor always must make read requests to the
body of enrypted payload. This is the main as-
sumption of the network-level emulation tehnique
[16, 17℄. Additionally, the read requests aused by
the deryptor must refer to the memory loated in
range of urrent data buer (basially to the on-
tents of shellode). This was intially the only as-
sumption in this detetion method. However it ap-
pears that sometimes random ode an ause hun-
dreds of read requests of dierent memory loations
in range of the data buer. This may lead to high
number of false positive alerts. Sine this assump-
tion alone was not strit enough, additional one was
reated. As it was stated before (setion 2.1.1), typ-
ial shellode uses GetPC ode in order to obtain
its virtual address in the memory. This assumption
is used together with the previous one (deryptor
needs to make read requests). Whenever in the ex-
eution path a GetPC ode blok is found and it is
followed by read requests to a memory loation in
range of the data buer, the data buer is marked
as shellode. Appending to the tests [16℄, by bas-
ing the detetion method on those assumptions the
network-level emulator was able to detet all om-
mon polymorphi shellodes without making false
positives alerts.
3 Limitations and ountermea-
sures
Even though the network-level emulation tehnique
is able to detet most of the urrently known poly-
morphi shellodes generated by various tools like
ADmutate [10℄, CLET [20℄, TaPiON [3℄ there are
still some serious issues that should be taken into
onsideration. This setion will list some of them.
Some of the issues presented here have already been
mentioned [16℄, however for the sake of understand-
ing the general network-level emulation limitations
they are presented and desribed more deeply in
this setion as well.
3.1 Address Spae and CPU Con-
text State Problem
The main problem of the emulation approah is
that it annot provide 100% orret memory view of
3
the proess address spae. Furthermore, it seems
to be impossible to nd a solution for this issue,
espeially in ase of intrusion detetion systems in-
stalled on the separate mahines. Of ourse one
of the potential short-term solutions would be to
statially map some of the mostly used Windows
libraries like KERNEL32.DLL or NTDLL.DLL. How-
ever this is a very limited solution and not re-
ally satisfatory. It is highly probable that more
skilled attaker would know his target well, so in
ase of exploiting an spei proess he may not
reveal the deryption routine ode if for example
some of the additional libraries (typially used by
the targeted proess) are missing (this an be eas-
ily ahieved by parsing PEB (Proess Enviroment
Blok) [18, 19, 13℄). It is very unlikely that any
intrusion detetion system based on the network-
level emulation approah will be able to solve suh
issues, sine typially suh systems are ompletely
separated from the target proess. Same goes for
the state of CPU ontext. Typially attaker an
assume some of the registers values - even if not
aurately the approximate value still an be al-
ulated. Sine emulators are separated from the
running proesses, they are unable to guess orret
values. For example libemu [2℄ nullies all regis-
ters values (exept ESP) before starting the emu-
lation proess, and some other solution [16℄ keeps
all of the registers values randomized. Both of pre-
sented methods an be defeated very easily, sine it
is very unlikely that generated random values will
meet ones from the attaked proess.
3.2 GetPC Code
The GetPC ode is often very important to
shellode. In fat most of the known shellodes
totally rely on it. The GetPC ode is usually
implemented in two ways, by using relative CALL
instrution or by using the FSTENV instrution.
The implementation used in libemu [2℄ sans for
either CALL rel (0xE8) opode and heks if the
all destination resides in data buer or sans for
the FSTENV instrution. If even one of the variants
is loated then ode is marked as potentially
harmful. The libemu implementation is not really
aurate sine instead of CALL rel instrution, a
CALL indiret may be used (where the operand
an be a memory loation or a register). For
example following sequene of instrutions (see
Listing 1) would initialize ESI register with the
address pointing to the rst instrution after CALL.
PUSH 0C390565Eh
CALL ESP
Listing 1: Variation of GetPC ode using indiret
CALL instrution.
Other methods may be used as well, like the SEH
(Strutured Exeption Handler) method
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[8℄. Fur-
thermore, in some ases the GetPC ode an be
simply omitted, by assuming one of the registers
or any other element from the attaked proess ad-
dress spae, point to the shellode base address (or
somewhere near). Sine emulator annot predit
suh values orretly (see setion 3.1 for details)
this is a very good and nasty evasion tehnique.
For example if attaker an assume his shellode
will be loated somewhere at the stak spae of
targeted module, he an use following algorithm to
nd the shellode memory address:
1. grab top stak address (FS:[0x04℄) and bot-
tom stak address (FS:[0x08℄) from TIB
(Thread Information Blok)
2. san the obtained stak memory range for a
shellode marker
Presented method does not rely on hard oded val-
ues and pratially an be applied to any Windows
shellode (of ourse shellode must be loated at
the stak). Important fat is even if the shellode
sans the stak memory spae (makes a read re-
quests) it still does not trigger the IDS alert, be-
ause it does not fulll the assumptions presented
in setion 2.1.2.
3.3 Read requests
As it was previously presented (setion 2.1.2) when
GetPC ode is missing in the gathered data buer
there is no need for the deryptor to hide the read
requests. However even with deteted GetPC ode
it is still possible to bypass the read requests de-
tetion tehnique. This an be ahieved by moving
the original shellode data to other loation (aside
3
Matter of fat this tehnique is often used for anti-
debugging, anti-emulator purposes espeially by exeutable
le pakers.
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from data buer) like to an alloated memory
spae. Problem of this tehnique is that in order
to opy the shellode to other loation deryptor
must still be able to read it - unfortunately suh
ation will result in setting of the IDS alarm. The
trik here is to fore other system omponents
to make the read aess instead of doing this
diretly from the shellode deryptor. This an be
ahieved by variety of triks sine a lot of mempy
alike funtions are found in most of the Windows
libraries. The ode presented below (Listing 2)
uses native API [12, 4℄ to alloate memory and
opy itself to the alloated region. In this example
ZwAlloateVirtualMemory (sysall #11h) fun-
tion is used to alloate neessary memory spae
and ZwReadVirtualMemory (sysall #BAh) is
used to opy the shellode to the newly obtained
loation. Both sysall numbers were targeted for
the Mirosoft Windows XP SP2 operating system.
xor eax ,eax
push PAGE_READWRITE_EXECUTE
push MEM_COMMIT
push offset region_size_ptr
push eax
push offset out_base
push -1
push offset ret1
push offset ret1
mov edx ,esp
mov eax ,011h
sysenter
ret1:
push eax
push REGION_SIZE
push dword ptr [ out_base ℄
push offset shellode
push -1
push offset ret2
push offset ret2
mov edx ,esp
mov eax ,0 BAh
sysenter
ret2:
Listing 2: Assembly pseudo-ode whih an be used
to evade payload-read detetion.
After the shellode reloation exeution an be on-
tinued from the newly alloated memory or just the
deryptor may refer to the alloated memory while
performing the deryption instead of using the ode
from the data buer. It's obvious that in this exam-
ple if the native API funtions will not be simulated
orretly future deryption proess will fail.
3.4 Time Limit
An emulator, no matter if it is used in the intrusion
detetion systems or antivirus software produts,
must do the analysis in xed period of time. This
is ruial and not possible to avoid. Generally ode
emulation is hundreds times slower then native ex-
eution. This is one of the biggest disadvantages of
the emulation approah. In the world of omputer
viruses several anti-emulation tehniques were de-
ployed to make use of this issue, like for example the
branhing tehnique [6℄. However shellodes unlike
viruses are very limited in size so in this ase teh-
niques like branhing (whih require a lot of ad-
ditional spae) are not very useful. Some of the
known polymorphi shellode generators [3℄ are us-
ing the RDTSC (Read Time Stamp Counter) instru-
tion to detet debuggers or some of the emulators.
However emulator may simulate the RDTSC instru-
tion and stay undeteted. The most basi and sta-
ble attempt in this ase would be to plae several
delaying loops whih would iterate enough times
until the nite time given for emulator to work will
not be onsumed. Appending to the report [16℄
additional heuristis were applied to detet endless
(innite) loops whih are sometimes found in the
random ode. However proposed heuristi meth-
ods an be easily defeated and basially a speially
rafted endless loop may be used to onsume entire
emulator time.
3.5 Other Tehniques
There are quite a lot of other tehniques that an
be used for bypassing network-level emulators. For
example, even if emulator traes all the memory
writes to the data buer it an only predit situ-
ations where the memory is not written from ex-
ternal omponents (like for example the operating
system kernel itself). So if shellode would use an
native API funtion like ZwWriteVirtualMemory
or any other suitable funtion to perform mem-
ory write, emulator would not be able to orretly
reprodue the hanges. Using the Prefeth Input
Queue (PIQ) [21℄ triks often ause a orruption of
the emulated ode, beause tis implementation is
not done orretly (like self-overwriting REP STOSB
et.). Additionally it appears none of the network-
5
level emulators an properly emulate FPU or SSE
instrutions, so in ase where the shellode de-
pends
4
on the results given by FPU, SSE instru-
tions it highly probable that emulation proess will
fail. The swarm attak [5℄ is also used against
network-level emulation systems. The main idea
of the swarm attak is to modify a ontrol hijak-
ing attak so that the shellode deoder will not
be present in any attak tra. This is ahieved
by building the deoder inside the attaked proess
from a small piees whih are send by multiple at-
tak instanes.
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5 Conlusion
In this paper the author presented main onepts
of network-emulation tehnique, together with its
advantages and weak spots. Appending to the re-
ports [17℄ real-world network-level emulation imple-
mentation provided good overall results in detet-
ing known polymorphi shellodes. This paper il-
lustrated potential evasion tehniques whih would
make the detetion harder or just impossible. It's
obvious that together with the growth of instru-
tion detetion systems based on network emulation
approah presented evasion tehniques will be ap-
plied to shellodes reation proess as well. From
the other hand network-level emulation solution re-
quires a lot of proessing power so it is very unlikely
it will relieve the signature detetion based solu-
tions soon if ever. Anyway time it ours we will
be prepared.
4
TaPiON [3℄ generates a deryptor together with FPU
instrutions as well, however they are not a part of the de-
rypting proess - they are used as NOP instrutions. This is
not a good solution beause emulator may just ignore suh
instrutions and still the deryption proess will sueed.
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